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power, and international neighborliness
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This study assesses the impact of international border walls on
evaluations of countries and on beliefs about bilateral relationships
between states. Using a short video, we experimentally manipulate
whether a border wall image appears in a broader description of
the history and culture of a little-known country. In a third condition, we also indicate which bordering country built the wall.
Demographically representative samples from the United States,
Ireland, and Turkey responded similarly to these experimental
treatments. Compared to a control group, border walls lowered
evaluations of the bordering countries. They also signiﬁed hostile
international relationships to third-party observers. Furthermore,
the government of the country responsible for building the wall
was evaluated especially negatively. Reactions were consistent
regardless of people’s predispositions toward walls in their domestic political context. Our ﬁndings have important implications for a
country’s attractiveness, or “soft power,” an important component
of nonmilitary inﬂuence in international relations.
borders j soft power j international relations
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ithin the past 10 years, states around the world have
accelerated the use of border walls and fences for purposes of border management and control. Much has been written about the cost and effectiveness of border walls, but no
evidence-based research exists about their psychological impact.
This study addresses the impact of border walls on third-party
evaluations of countries and on perceptions of the quality of
international relationships between neighboring states.
Our main hypothesis is that those who are aware that a border wall exists between two countries will rate the neighboring
states as having worse relations than would otherwise be the
case. In addition, they will evaluate states with border walls
more negatively than those without them. This potential effect
is important because international relations are thought to be
influenced by the “attractiveness” of states and their societies, a
phenomenon that international relations scholars refer to as
“soft power” (1, 2). Countries that are viewed positively by the
citizens of other countries benefit from greater credibility and
influence in international relations (1). Thus, scholarship on
soft power focuses on factors that may positively or negatively
affect perceptions of one country in the eyes of citizens of other
countries. Because ordinary citizens often lack much information about other countries, they tend to rely on highly visible
cues when making such judgments. In this study, we hypothesize that one such cue is a country’s border infrastructure.
Borders, Walls, and Soft Power
Almost all of the studies of border infrastructure to date address
how border infrastructure affects national security or transborder crime (3). Some find that border barriers have highly conditional security effects (4), undesired environmental impacts (5),
and unanticipated economic consequences (6). The study of psychological impacts of border walls has been limited to the effects
on proximate inhabitants, which is quite distinct from the thirdperson perspective in our study. For example, Berliners and
PNAS 2022 Vol. 119 No. 4 e2117797119

other East Germans experienced what psychologist Dietfried
M€
uller-Hegemann (7) called a “wall-disease” from their enclosure experience. A recent study in Northern Ireland suggests
that psychological maladies in walled border communities—
from depression to alcoholism—result from a sense of separation (8). However, studies have not considered the impact of
border infrastructure on a country’s international image, which
is the central focus in this study.
The recently accelerating phenomenon of border hardening
merits investigation for its potential implications for international relations (9). Our goal is to assess the inferences people
draw from the existence of border walls, abstracted from border politics in people’s own countries, and independent of partisan cues. We seek to understand the psychological inferences
that people draw from the sheer existence of a barrier between
states when walls per se are not the focus of attention or political controversy.
Among its own citizens, assessments of a country’s international standing tend to be rooted in domestic politics. For
example, among Americans, opinions about a wall along the
southern US border are highly partisan. Currently, there is
tremendous support among Republicans and greater opposition from Democrats (10). In contrast, our research question
is how citizens of other countries view the same country with
and without a border wall.
Our research speaks directly to the issue of soft power, but it
does so more systematically than the public opinion literature
(11) or discourse analysis (12), of which both face significant
inferential limitations. As the originator of the concept has

Signiﬁcance
Studies to date have focused on the impact of border walls
on national security, transborder crime, and the environment. This study addresses how border walls affect the way
a country is viewed by the citizens of other countries, all
else being equal. Using an experimental design that is replicated in the United States, Ireland, and Turkey, we ﬁnd that
the presence of walls on borders harms countries’ international image. This is especially true if the country is known
to have been the builder of the wall. Walls also lower evaluations of the bordering countries’ bilateral relationship.
Although the presence of a wall increases perceptions of a
country’s border security, paradoxically it lowers the perceived security of people within the country.
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recently emphasized, soft power rests on foreign perceptions of
the relative attractiveness of a society’s culture, its foreign policy,
and its values (13). As such, foreign perceptions of another country’s attractiveness are central to the concept of soft power. The
problem has always been how to measure such perceptions. The
“Soft Power 30 Index” (SPI-30) is one such effort, but this index
relies primarily on data its creators have gathered from other
sources. Based on survey data, the SPI-30 finds that “friendliness”
and “foreign policy” are strongly related to respondents’ claims of
attraction to a foreign country and asserts that a country’s level of
global “engagement”* should be weighted most strongly. We
incorporate these insights into our experimental research, avoiding measures that make untested assumptions about elements of
soft power as well as the problems of constructing a valid comparative global index (14).
Our goal is to draw strong inferences about soft power in
response to one of the most visible and controversial foreign
policy actions taken by states in recent years, namely, the erection of border walls with neighbors. To do so in a way that
allows strong causal inferences, we use an experimental design
involving countries about which our respondents have little preexisting knowledge. In addition, we utilize demographically representative nonprobability samples of participants drawn from
three different countries, each with differing domestic predispositions toward border walls.
Theory and Expectations
Our expectations are based in part on automatic, well-documented
psychological reactions to spatial distance and separation and in
part on the kinds of cognitive inferences we expect people to
make about the presence of walls on international borders. First,
it is well-established that primitive human perceptual processes
are rooted in spatial relations, which are among the most basic
of psychological constructs (15). Physical distance serves as the
foundation for human understanding of psychological distance
(16). To be close to or distant from an entity naturally confounds
having it within one’s field of view with one’s psychological distance from it. Things that are unseen are automatically construed as both more psychologically and socially distant. Physical
distance and visual separation can influence both people’s judgments and their affect toward what is on the other side.
Research shows that walls manipulate perceptions of space.
When barriers separate objects so that people cannot see what
is on the other side, this changes observers’ mental estimates of
the distance between those entities (17). Because spatial perception and psychological distance are tightly intertwined in the
human mind, spatial distances can be systematically distorted
by social distance and vice versa (18). For example, lower emotional involvement with a city leads people to estimate that the
city is further away (19).
These reciprocal effects among different dimensions of
distance—social, psychological, and physical—also manifest
themselves in affective reactions to close and distant targets.
Close physical distance tends to activate empathic reactions
that characterize affectively close relationships even when the
relationship itself is held constant (20). When primed to think
in terms of distance as opposed to proximity, people provide
weaker, less positive reports of emotional attachments (21).
We hypothesize that border structures between countries will
be interpreted by observers as indicative of greater psychological distance between the countries and in turn will lead to
more negative inferences about the relationship between two
neighboring countries.
*According to the index’s published methodology, “engagement” includes “metrics
such as the number of embassies/high commissions a country has abroad, membership
in multilateral organisations, and overseas development aid” (14, 30).
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In addition to the information conveyed automatically by
visual separation, citizens may react cognitively based on their
understanding of why states erect walls. Walls are typically built
to keep out what is on the other side, often to satisfy a domestic
constituency who may be unlikely to think about how people in
third-party countries will view this action. We expect that the
country to whom the act of distancing is attributed will be viewed
especially negatively in light of this information. Despite Robert
Frost’s poetic line that good fences make good neighbors, we
would draw a contrary lesson from one of the most notorious
modern efforts to use walls to “secure” and separate, namely, the
Berlin Wall. At least one study suggests that the wall was ideologically potent enough to help convert Germany into a victim of
Soviet control in the eyes of many if not most Europeans (22).
Conversely, when the wall fell in 1989, it was described by thirdparty observers in Britain as “one of the most joyful events ever
witnessed by the world” (22). Of course, not all border walls carry
the emotional freight of the Berlin Wall. Nonetheless, from the
perspective of third parties, we expect that walls will be viewed as
hostile international structures even if they are also viewed as
security enhancing. To the extent that a country putting up a wall
is viewed by other countries as more hostile and difficult to
get along with, international attitudes toward that country may
shift in a negative direction, directly degrading a state’s soft
power. If so, building walls may have important consequences for
international relations that go well beyond effects on the immediate bordering countries.
Finally, we predict that these results will hold regardless of
people’s opinions about border walls within their own country
and regardless of their proximity to their own national borders.
Domestic support for walls may stem from partisan cues and
geographic locations as well as assumptions about what they
will accomplish. But when judging other countries about which
they have little to no knowledge, we predict that building walls
will be seen as hostile and contribute to more negative attitudes
toward the wall-building country in particular.
Research Design
To test the generalizability of these hypotheses, we fielded the
same experiment in three very different contexts, as follows:
the United States, Ireland, and Turkey. In the United States,
border issues are highly salient, partisan, and increasingly controversial. The Republic of Ireland’s border with Northern
Ireland has a troubled history of localized violence which was
only settled in 1997. Walling and fencing has been removed
between most of the Republic and the North. Much Irish
opposition to Brexit stemmed from a desire to avoid rebuilding border infrastructure (23). Of these three countries, Turkey may be most positively predisposed toward walls since for
more than a decade, Turkey has faced a civil war to its southeast in Syria, periodic cross-border Kurdish terrorism, and the
recent rise and decline of the Islamic “State” (ISIS) in neighboring Iraq. In this context, a wall could be interpreted by our
Turkish respondents as protective.
All respondents in these experimental studies viewed a 3.5-min
video entitled “Countries of the World: Tajikistan.”† The video
purported to be part of an educational series on little-known
countries. It featured still photos and video segments with
music and narration throughout. All three versions were identical in describing the geography, natural resources, history,
sports, foods, and holidays of Tajikistan, the central topic of
the video. Respondents were told they would be evaluating the
video as an educational tool. They were asked factual questions about what they had learned after viewing.
†

The treatment condition videos can be found here: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/
EXPXCT.
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Results
Hypothesis 1 suggests that the presence of a wall will lower overall evaluations of both countries. This hypothesis was tested using
a mixed model ANOVA including a repeated-measures main
effect for exposure to the video and a between-group factor representing random assignment to the wall condition or the no-wall
condition. Confirmation of a differential change from watching
the two videos was evaluated using the interaction between the
pre- to posttreatment and whether the video condition included a
wall or not (SI Appendix, Table S1).
Fig. 1 shows the effects of the wall treatment on evaluations
of Tajikistan (Left) and Kyrgyzstan (Right) for each of the three
experiments. The constant material in the videos—about the
people and customs of this little-known country—generally
improved attitudes toward both countries. In the United States
and Ireland, most respondents started out the experiment near
the midpoint of the scale in their evaluations, consistent with
little relevant foreknowledge. Turkey, in contrast, registered
somewhat more positive views of these countries.
Most importantly, the expected interaction is supported in all
six cases, with differential increases by experimental condition
(SI Appendix, Table S1). Overall impressions of Tajikistan were
roughly equivalent pretreatment, but by posttreatment, impressions of Tajikistan had grown more positive in the no-wall condition than in the wall condition. On average, the presence of the
wall lowered the positivity of evaluations of Tajikistan by around
7 to 8% in the United States and Ireland and by around 4% in
Turkey. The finding of differential pre- to posttreatment change
based on whether respondents saw a wall or not is remarkably
consistent across all three countries.
The wall condition reduced positive evaluations of Kyrgyzstan
even more. The average effect size in the United States, Ireland,
and Turkey was 12, 10, and 5%, respectively. In all three countries, there was a significant interaction between the extent of
pre- to posttreatment change and experimental condition.
Hypothesis 2 evaluates the impact of a wall on perceptions of
the quality of the bilateral relationship (SI Appendix, Table S2).
Overwhelmingly, those who viewed the no-wall condition inferred
that the relationship between the two countries was more positive
and cooperative than those who viewed the wall condition. As
shown in Fig. 2, the size of these effects is substantial. On average, showing just a few seconds of wall in the video lowered
assessments of Tajikistan’s and Kyrgyzstan’s bilateral relationship
by 15% in the United States, 14% in Ireland, and 12% in Turkey.
Countries bordered by walls are seen as less likely to engage in
successful relationships with neighboring countries.
Finally, do respondents downgrade their impression of the
government of Kyrgyzstan relative to Tajikistan under the wall
built by Kyrgyzstan condition (hypothesis 3)? As illustrated in
Fig. 3 and confirmed by the analyses in SI Appendix, Table S3, in
each of the three comparisons, evaluations of Tajikistan’s government are systematically and significantly higher than those of
Kyrgyzstan when people were told that Kyrgyzstan was responsible for building the wall. This is especially notable given that in
the wall condition that serves as the basis for comparison, the
builder is not specified, but could be either country.
We next examined whether the documented reactions to walls
varied by respondents’ domestic political leanings that might predispose them to favor or oppose walls. While Democrats and
Republicans feel very differently about walling the US southern
border with Mexico (24), we found that both Democrats and
Republicans responded equally negatively to the wall treatments
in these videos compared to the no-wall condition and equally
negatively toward Kyrgyzstan when given the information that
Kyrgyzstan had built the border wall with Tajikistan. We also
found similar results in Ireland for both supporters and opponents of Brexit with its politically salient implications for the Irish
PNAS j 3 of 7
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2117797119

POLITICAL SCIENCES

Respondents were randomly assigned to one of three versions
of the treatment. At one point in the video, the narrator mentions
that Tajikistan shares a border with neighboring Kyrgyzstan. In
the “no-wall” (control) condition, the narrator refers to the border, and a valley between two mountains is shown. In the “wall”
condition, when the border between Tajikistan and its neighbor is
mentioned, it is called a “border wall,” and a picture of a wall is
shown instead of the valley. In the third condition, “wall built by
Kyrgyzstan,” the same visuals are shown as those in the wall condition, but the narrator mentions in passing that the wall was originally built by Kyrgyzstan, the neighboring country.
Our hypotheses were identical across representative samples
of the United States, Turkey, and Northern Ireland and the
Republic of Ireland.
Hypothesis 1. The wall condition will lower overall evaluations of both countries relative to the no-wall (control) condition. The pretreatment survey asked respondents, in the following
question, to rate on a 7-point scale a list of four countries, among
which Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan were included: “Based on what
you know, what is your general impression of each of the following countries?” The same question was asked posttreatment.
This approach made it possible to control for the effects of the
video content, which was otherwise constant across conditions,
while evaluating the impact of the experimental treatment.
Hypothesis 2. Respondents assigned to the wall condition will
view the bilateral relationship between the two countries more
negatively than those in the no-wall condition. A series of nine
questions asked about the quality of the countries’ relationship,
for example, whether the two countries trust one another, trade
with one another, and so forth (SI Appendix). Because these
measures were strongly intercorrelated, they were combined into
a highly reliable additive index of the quality of the bilateral relationship, with Cronbach’s alphas ranging from 0.91 to 0.92 across
the three countries. We expected the bilateral relationship to be
more positive for those in the no-wall (control) group than those
assigned to the wall conditions.
Hypothesis 3. Relative to respondents in the wall condition,
those assigned to the wall built by Kyrgyzstan condition will
view the government of Kyrgyzstan less positively relative to the
government of Tajikistan. To test this expectation, two separate
but parallel series of questions were asked about the government of each country. Each formed a reliable index of attitudes
toward the country’s government (details in SI Appendix).
Scores were differenced, with higher scores reflecting the view
that Tajikistan’s government is superior to Kyrgyzstan’s government. Thus, a higher score in the wall condition would suggest
that respondents are “punishing” the government of Kyrgyzstan
with lower evaluations when told that Kyrgyzstan is responsible
for building the wall.
Additional features of the study helped to ensure consistent
and credible results across countries. First, with the exception
of questions relating to political identity/affiliation, identical
questions and response scales were used across all three
experiments. Second, manipulation checks in all three experiments confirmed that respondents in the treatment conditions
did, in fact, notice the information pertaining to our experimental treatments (SI Appendix, Figs. S1–S3). These questions
were asked after the dependent variables to avoid calling
attention to the treatments. Although the wall visuals were
shown for less than 10 seconds in total and were only mentioned in passing by the narrator, the visual wall cue effectively communicated the presence of a wall on the border.
Indicating the wall was built by Kyrgyzstan was more subtle but
still produced a significant manipulation. To facilitate comparisons of effect sizes across countries, dependent variables were
rescaled to range from 0 to 1. All three samples were over n =
1,000 and demographically representative of their respective
countries (details in SI Appendix).
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Fig. 1. Effects of the presence of a wall versus no wall on evaluations of Tajikistan (Left) and Kyrgyzstan (Right), by nationality of respondents. All six
analyses demonstrate signiﬁcant interactions between pre- to posttreatment change and presence of the wall (P < 0.001), in addition to a main effect of
viewing the video (P < 0.001). Error bars represent 95% conﬁdence intervals. Details are provided in SI Appendix, Table S1.

border. Results were also similar across parties in Turkey, even
those most closely identified with Kurdish interests, whose communities may have been most impacted by the wall on Turkey’s
southeastern border. When viewed from the perspective of a
third-party observer, powerful political orientations have relatively little impact on how border walls are interpreted.
Finally, some research suggests that geographic context
matters for attitudes about border security (25). To investigate this possibility, in each of the three countries, respondents’ latitudes and longitudes were used to calculate how far
the respondent was from an international border in their
own country. We then divided respondents into those above
or below the median distance from an international border
and looked for interactions between distance and each of our
4 of 7 j PNAS
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experimental treatments. In no case did we find evidence of
significant interactions between the experimental treatments
and geographic distance.
Discussion
Border walls affect observers’ perceptions of states in consistently negative ways. Not only is this finding the case across very
different countries in fundamentally different contexts, but it is
also stable regardless of the respondent’s preexisting political
views and their distance to an international border. In all three
countries, no matter people’s politics or within-country location,
the presence of border infrastructure lowered evaluations of the
countries and eroded perceptions of the quality of their
Mutz and Simmons
The psychology of separation: border walls, soft power,
and international neighborliness
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Fig. 2. Effects of the presence of a wall versus no wall on perceptions of bilateral relations, by nationality of respondents. The main effects of a wall versus
no wall were signiﬁcant in all three country analyses (P < 0.001). Error bars represent 95% conﬁdence intervals. Details are provided in SI Appendix, Table S2.

international relationships. If a country was perceived to be
responsible for erecting the wall, it was viewed especially negatively. Turkish respondents demonstrated a consistent pattern
of smaller effects than the other countries, although these differences were not statistically significant. This pattern most
likely results from the fact that Turkish respondents had prior
opinions of these countries.
How do we reconcile these findings with the apparent domestic
political enthusiasm for walls around the world? In the United
States, people seem quite capable of interpreting walls on their
country’s own borders differently from those between other countries. Highly polarized opinions about the desirability of walls can
obviously coexist along with negative reactions when other countries put them up. Our results show that in the absence of partisan
cues, people fall back on basic understandings of what walls and
physical distancing represent. The presence of a wall signaled
unfriendliness and a motive to create distance from the neighboring country. People interpreted a border wall as indicating a preference or desire to separate from the neighboring country.
This interpretation is supported by the treatment that informed
respondents about which country built the wall. Exposed to the
same visual image, respondents systematically and consistently
downgraded the builder. There is no change in visual perspective between the wall condition and the Kyrgyzstan built the
wall condition, which suggests that automatic psychological
reactions get us only part way toward understanding how walls
affect more complex political judgments. Across all three countries, respondents made the additional cognitive judgment that
a state responsible for distancing (Kyrgyzstan built the wall) is
less attractive than it would otherwise be (e.g., in the wall condition). In other words, people in all three countries judged the
experimental video’s representation of border walling to be an
unfriendly gesture,‡ one that led them to downgrade their opinion of Kyrgyzstan relative to Tajikistan.
At the same time, border walls do appear to positively affect
perceptions of border security. When respondents in these
experiments were asked, “How strong is border security between
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan?”, they consistently judged border
security as stronger in the two wall conditions than that in the
no-wall condition (Fig. 4, Left). The effect was substantial, ranging from 13 to 29 percentage points higher in the wall conditions
across the three countries.

‡

It is possible that a colorfully painted wall would have a different effect. See https://
www.serargentino.com/gente/lo-peor-de-nosotros/el-muro-de-donald-trump-pero-enmisiones. But this experiment did not test for variation in border walls aesthetics.
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However, when these same respondents were asked about
the personal safety of those living in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan
(“How safe do you think the people are from violence and
crime?”), the wall treatment had precisely the opposite effect
(Fig. 4, Right). Those assigned to the wall conditions consistently
assumed the people in these countries had significantly less personal safety than those in the no-wall condition. Although this
may seem counterintuitive, there is a clear logic to their inferences, as follows: just as the presence of police in a neighborhood may suggest something illegal is afoot, respondents who
saw a wall in the video inferred that there were security issues of
some kind that necessitated a border wall. Political rhetoric suggesting that walls are necessary for purposes of keeping criminals
out has been prominent in the United States (26), but it is
surprising to see this same reaction of essentially the same
size across all three countries.
Interestingly, the negative effect of the wall condition applies
to people as well as governments. To probe perceptions of each
society we asked the following: “How favorable or unfavorable
is your view of everyday people in [Tajikistan/Kyrgyzstan, the
country to the north of Tajikistan]?” A parallel question was
asked about governments and political leaders. We averaged
assessments of people and of governments across both countries and pooled the results for the American, Irish, and Turkish
samples. Respondents were significantly more likely to view
Tajikistan’s people unfavorably in the wall treatment, as was the
case for evaluations of the government (SI Appendix, Table S6).
The video did not explicitly say that the state constructed the
border wall. It is thus somewhat surprising that respondents
judged “the people” just as harshly as they did “political leaders” for the border barrier in these videos.
Broader Implications
Our findings speak directly to the impact of border security policies on soft power. Three decades ago, Joseph Nye claimed
that soft power was almost as important as hard (military)
power. While scholars have pointed to factors that make a country attractive to others, our research suggests that repulsion may
be important to keep in mind as well. Moreover, while most
research on soft power focuses on broad traits that are not readily manipulable policy levers (the quality of institutions and
entrepreneurialism), our results suggest that there are some
very specific policies that catalyze strong negative attitudes.
Such strong negative attitudes may inhere in the hostile signal
that borders walls send to neighbors, potentially impacting such
important outcomes as bilateral trade (6). Indeed, recent research
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Fig. 3. Comparison of perceived superiority of Tajikistan’s government to
Kyrgyzstan’s government, by wall condition versus the wall built by Kyrgyzstan. All three comparisons are signiﬁcantly different, with F = 10.97,
26.43, and 8.46, respectively. Error bars represent 95% conﬁdence intervals. Details are provided in SI Appendix, Table S3.
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Fig. 4. Perceived strength of border security (Left), and perceived level of personal security (Right), by wall versus no-wall conditions. On the Left, all
three country comparisons are signiﬁcantly different (P < 0.001), with F = 320.73, 395.46, and 61.59, respectively. On the Right, all three countries are
also signiﬁcantly different, with F = 9.03 (P < 0.05), 6.20 (P < 0.01), and 6.56 (P < 0.05), respectively. Error bars represent 95% conﬁdence intervals. Details
are provided in SI Appendix, Tables S4 and S5.

has suggested that desecuritization—playing down the security
aspects of infrastructure—can be a soft power strategy (27). We
do not argue there is an inevitable tradeoff between hard and soft
power, but it is important to appreciate the possibility that some
symbolic security measures may well reduce a state’s attractiveness
more than they enhance national security.
Our results imply that if policymakers do care about soft
power (and they seem to; refs. 28, 29), they should consider the
potential damage border walls may have on a nation’s image.
This is quite important since in many cases border walls are of
questionable economic (30), immigration (31), crime fighting
(32), public health (33), or security benefit (4). Whatever
advantages flow from border walls should be balanced against
the unfavorable perceptions that the builder is likely to garner.
While we are not the first to associate “friendlier” border policies
with soft power (e.g., ref. 34), our findings speak scientifically
to this possibility.
Materials and Methods
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Data. The survey experiments were administered in the United States from
October 24 to 31, 2019 (n = 1,022); in Ireland from March 20 to 26, 2020 (n =
1,108); and in Turkey from September 1 to 15, 2020 (n = 1,025). In all three
countries, respondents were recruited by Forthright, Inc. Experimental samples were constructed to be demographically representative of their respective countries on gender, age, race/ethnicity, and region, although they were
not acquired using probability sampling methods.
Measures.
Evaluations of countries (pre- and posttreatment). “Based on what you
know, what is your general impression of each of the following countries?”
[7-point scale, high = positive]. Countries included France, Italy, Tajikistan,
and Kyrgyzstan.
Perceived strength of border security. “How strong is border security
between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan?” [5-point scale, rescaled to 0 to 1].
Perceived personal security. “How safe do you think the people of [Tajikistan/Kyrgyzstan] are from violence and crime?” [5-point scale]. Answers to
both questions were averaged and then rescaled to range from 0 to 1.
Bilateral relations between countries. Each item below was measured on a
5-point scale in which high = positive relationship. A highly reliable additive
index produced a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.91 in the United States, 0.92 in Ireland, and 0.91 in Turkey. For ease of interpretation, the index was rescaled to
vary between 0 and 1.
1. Would you say that relations today between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are
very good, somewhat good, neither good nor bad, somewhat bad, or very
bad?
2. Would you say that Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are friendly or unfriendly
toward one another?
6 of 7 j PNAS
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3. How much do you think the people in these two countries trust one
another?
4. How likely are Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to trade with one another?
5. How likely are the governments of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to cooperate
with one another?
6. How easy do you think it is for the people in these two countries to visit
one another?
7. To the best of your knowledge, are Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan allies, enemies, or something in between?
8. How much do you think the people in these two countries like or dislike
each other?
9. How strong is border security between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan?
Superiority of government of Tajikistan relative to Kyrgyzstan. Two additive indexes were created, namely, one for evaluations of Tajikistan and one
for Kyrgyzstan. The reliabilities of the Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan indexes,
respectively, were as follows: US respondents, 0.87, 0.90; Irish respondents,
0.87, 0.90; and Turkish respondents, 0.91, 0.92. The difference (Tajikistan –
Kyrgyzstan) provides a measure of the perceived superiority of Tajikistan’s
government. All questions were asked separately in a random order on 1 to 5
scales. The index was rescaled to range between 0 and 1.
1. How favorable or unfavorable is your view of the government and political
leadership of [Tajikistan/Kyrgyzstan]?
2. How much do you think the government of [Tajikistan/Kyrgyzstan]
respects individual human rights?
3. How much freedom do you think people in [Tajikistan/Kyrgyzstan] have to
come and go as they please?
4. How much freedom do you think people in [Tajikistan/Kyrgyzstan] have to
criticize their government when they feel it is appropriate?
5. To what extent is [Tajikistan/Kyrgyzstan] open or closed off to people who
want to visit from outside their country?
6. So far as you know, how does [Tajikistan/Kyrgyzstan] feel about its neighboring countries?
7. How safe do you think the people of [Tajikistan/Kyrgyzstan] are from violence and crime?
8. How likely is it that [Tajikistan/Kyrgyzstan] tries to promote peace between
nations?
9. How likely is it that the government of [Tajikistan/Kyrgyzstan] wants to
cooperate with other countries?
Evaluations of people. “How favorable or unfavorable is your view of everyday people in [Tajikistan/Kyrgyzstan]?” The 5-point scales were combined and
rescaled to 0 to 1.
Evaluations of government. “How favorable or unfavorable is your view of
the government and political leadership of [Tajikistan/Kyrgyzstan]?” The
5-point scales were combined and rescaled to 0 to 1.
Institutional Review Board Review. This study was judged to be exempt from
the need for review due to minimal risk to participants under protocol number 833165. Participants in all three countries were paid through Forthright, a
survey research company. Informed consent was obtained. Protocols for
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